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Abstract 
Events occupy a central place in natural language. Accordingly, an 
understanding of them is crucial if one is to have any kind of a the-
oretically well-motivated account of natural language understanding 
and generation. It is proposed here that speakers create a cognitive 
structure for each discourse and process it as they introduce sentences 
into the discourse. The structure for each sentence depends system-
atically on its tense, aspect and the situation type; its effect on the 
discourse also depends on the structures of the sentences that precede 
it. It is also argued that the perfective aspect introduces the struc-
ture of the given event in its entirety. The progressive, by contrast, 
introduces only the core of the structure of the given event excluding, 
in particular, its preparatory processes and resultant state. Similarly, 
the perfect and the perfective can be distinguished on the basis of the 
temporal schemata they introduce. While the perfective presents the 
event as complete, the perfect presents it as complete and closed; i.e., 
the perfect prevents succeeding discourse from being interpreted as 
falling during the given event. This is surprising since the perfect is 
otherwise simply the combination of the perfective and a tense. This 
paper also provides a key motivation for distinguishing between the 
preparatory processes and the preliminary stages of an event. This 
observation, which is crucial in distinguishing between the perfective 
and the progressive has not been made in the literature. 
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2 
1 Introduction 
The issues of the ontology of events, of how they are represented by human 
speakers and hearers of natural language, of how they are referred to by 
different sentences and of the kinds of temporal relations that exist or are 
perceived among them are all matters of great importance in the fields of 
Linguistics and Cognitive Science. How these issues are resolved would also 
have great significance in the Computational Linguistics and Artificial Intel-
ligence research communities as well, where designing natural representation 
of events is a critical first step in building programs to understand and gener-
ate natural language. A semantically well-motivated analysis of events would 
not only describe how individual sentences describing events are structured, 
but also how they interact in discourses. It is interesting to note that many 
of the required features of sentences become clearer when the bigger picture, 
i.e., discourses, are considered. 
One of the problems that motivates the research described herein concerns 
the temporal relations that exist, or can be inferred, between the events de-
scribed by the successive sentences in a discourse. This problem is especially 
interesting in cases where the sentences themselves lack any explicit indica-
tors of their relative ordering. This problem has been addressed previously 
by many researchers, who seem to think that an immediate introduction of 
pragmatics is required [Dowty, 1986; Lascarides and Asher, 1990]. I hope to 
show that a large part of the problem is dissolved when complex representa-
tions for events such as those proposed in this paper are used. 
Another, somewhat related, problem is of the semantics of the so-called 
when-clauses. When-clauses, e.g., in sentence 1 due to Ritchie [1979], seem 
to allow all possible temporal orderings of the main and subordinate clauses, 
depending on what those clauses are. 
1. When they built the 39th street bridge, ... 
a) A local architect drew up the plans. 
b) They used the best materials. 
c) They solved most of the traffic problems. 
This problem has also been studied by Moens and Steedman. The explana-
tion provided by them is that each event has a nucleus which includes the 
preparatory process and the resultant state of the event. This idea is related 
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to the temporal schemata introduced by Smith [1991]. Moens and Steedman 
interpret sentence la as referring to the preparatory process of the building 
of the bridge, sentence 1 b as referring to the actual building of the bridge 
and sentence lc as referring to the resultant state. The choice is made purely 
on pragmatic knowledge [Moens and Steedman, 1988]. 
In this paper, I accept many of the intuitions of Smith and of Moens 
and Steedman about the structure of events, but develop a more fine-grained 
analysis than their respective theories. I motivate a more elaborate structure 
of events of different situation types (which I describe shortly). These struc-
tures I call the temporal schemata of the given events. I also introduce the 
concept of a foil as distinct from the structure that exists for each event as 
described by the speaker. A foil describes a structure created from a sequence 
of sentences and more closely matches the structure of the described events, 
as they are introduced into the discourse by the speaker. While the schema 
of an event describes it as standing by itself, the foil of a discourse describes 
the information about the events that the participants of the discourse have 
extracted from it. The events described by successive sentences in a discourse 
are integrated into the foil that already exists for the discourse as it has pro-
gressed so far. Note, however, that not every part of the schema of an event 
in a discourse need be included in the foil that is generated. Intuitively, a 
temporal schema is like a transparency that may be slid into position on top 
of the existing foil in any of a limited number of ways.1 
In the analysis I propose, every event type has an associated temporal 
schema. The exact structure of the temporal schema of an event depends 
crucially on its situation type and the viewpoint aspect that the speaker 
chooses to represent it with. Every sentence brings along a temporal schema 
which may be all or a part of the situation. The temporal schema may be 
understood as a cognitive representation of the event type in the speaker's 
and the hearer's mind. Though the tense of a sentence is important in 
locating the event with respect to the time of the utterance, I do not consider 
it in detail here.2 
1 Hence the term "foil." To those for whom the connection to Discourse Representation 
Theory of [Heim, 1982; Kamp , 1984] is obvious, a foil is just a file, pronounced with a New 
Jersey accent . 
2English has three tenses namely, past, present and future . Some languages divide time 
only into past and non-past; future and non-future and so on. Since English has a three 
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In §2, I provide a description of the situation types taken from Smith, 
which extend the classification proposed by Vendler [Vendler, 1967]. In §3.1, 
I give a brief introduction to the different possible aspectual classes. In §3, 
I motivate a general theory, which I call foil theory, to capture the cognitive 
basis of temporal reference. In §3.2, I present a cognitive analysis of the 
perfective aspect and temporal ontology. In §3.3, I present an analysis for 
the progressive. In §3.5, introduce the grammatical categories of the perfect 
and the futurate. In §3.6, I distinguish between the foils introduced by the 
perfective and the perfect. 
2 The Structure of Situations 
2.1 Situation Types 
Each sentence may be seen as characterizing a situation [Smith, 1991]. It 
is customary, following Vendler, to divide situations into the categories of 
states and events [Vendler, 1967]. States are non-dynamic situations that 
hold homogeneously, e.g., "know German," "be tall." Events are dynamic 
situations and may be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Event types are fur-
ther divided into activities, e.g., "walk in the park," any part of which is 
also walking in the park, achievements, e.g., "win a race," which is instan-
taneous and accomplishments, e.g., "build a house," which is the action of 
building, terminating in the completion of the house. Another category of 
events is that of semelfactives, e.g., "to hiccup," which are instantaneous 
like achievements, but unlike them do not have any well-defined resultant 
states (in the viewpoint of the speaker). These are included in the diagram 
of event types given in Figure 1 only for completeness-they are sufficiently 
like achievements to not merit separate discussion in this paper. 
Sometimes, situation types are also called the aspectuaZ classes of the 
given sentence. It is often convenient to refer to achievements and accom-
plishments as telic events and to activities as atelic events. Telic event types 
have a natural final endpoint; e.g., the building of a house is over when the 
house has been built and the reaching to the top is over when one arrives 
there. By contrast, atelic events may end at any time, i.e., they have arbi-
way distinction, I base the present analysis on this maximal subdivision of t ime. 
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trary final endpoints only. The temporal schemata of different types of events 
are depicted as follows by Smith [1991J. Here, I denotes the initial endpoint 
of an event, F N the natural final endpoint, F A an arbitrary final endpoint, 
R the result state, ellipsis continued action and parentheses optionality. 
2. Achievements: (1) ( ... ) F N (R) ... 
3. Accomplishments: I .. . F N (R) 
4. Activities: I ... F A 
It does not make sense to give a temporal schema for states since they 
neither have endpoints and are not dynamic. They merely hold for periods 
of time as events occur. An important characteristic of states is that they 
hold over intervals. For example, "John knows French" is a proposition that 
holds over an interval since John last learned it and till he forgets it. At best, 
states can be depicted temporally as in 5 below. 
5. States: ..... . 
In general, the main bases for classifying situation types are their du-
ration, (i.e., whether they are instantaneous or durative) and whether they 
have culminations. The resulting classification is shown in Figure 1. Krifka 
classifies situation types also on the basis of the manner in which the ob-
ject may be affected and so on. These subclassifications provide important 
insights into the study of tense and aspect but, for the purposes of this pa-
per, I assume the coarser classification presented in Figure 1. The reader is 
encouraged to see [Krifka, 1989; Krifka, 1991J for details of his classification. 
DURATIVE INSTANTANEOUS 
CULMINATED Accomplishments Achievements 
UNCULMINATED Activities Semelfacti ves 
Figure 1: Classification of Event Types 
In the rest of this section, I present a more elaborate structure of the 
temporal schema that I argue is required to talk of temporal reference. The 
schemata for each situation type are defined independently of the aspect. The 
aspect supplies a further filter on these schemata in ways that are described 
in §3. 
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2.2 Accomplishments 
To be able to interpret narrative discourse temporally, we must provide a 
more elaborate structure for events than the simple one described in §2. 
Moens and Steedman present one such structure that they call the nucleus 
of the given event. For culminated event types, namely, accomplishments 
and achievements, they propose the schema diagramed in Figure 2 [Moens 
and Steedman, 1988]. 
~I~ 
preparatory resultant 
process Culmination state 
Figure 2: Nucleus of Culminated Event Types 
Unfortunately, the Moens and Steedman approach, while more elaborate 
than the traditional one, still has some limitations. As I will show later in this 
paper, these limitations arise from their (1) treating the perfect as applicable 
only to culminations, (2) treating the progressive as being applicable only to 
processes, (3) not treating the perfective separately from the perfect and (4) 
not distinguishing the preparatory processes and the preliminary stages of 
an event. I will concentrate here on the proposed approach, and compare it 
where appropriate with Moens and Steedman's. 
In order to capture the relevant properties of accomplishments, I propose 
the schema diagramed in Figure 3. As I go along I will explain the motivations 
for including various details, e.g., the various sub events of the actual event, 
the distinction between preparatory processes and preliminary stages, and so 
on. 
In Figure 3, I is the initial endpoint, i.e., the point at which the event 
begins. FN is the natural final endpoint of the event. This refers to the 
point where the event would end naturally. For example, the natural final 
endpoint of the predicate "drinking a glass of beer" is when the beer in the 
glass has been consumed (and the drinking of the same glass of beer can 
go on no longer). The events ell e2, etc., are the subevents of E. FA refers 
to an arbitrary final endpoint of E. These endpoints are more naturally 
found in telic events that have a long duration. For example, "to build a 
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preparatory 
stages 
I 
E 
resultant 
state 
Figure 3: The Structure of Accomplishments 
bridge" is a predicate that is likely to take time. And it is natural that 
all the building will not take place at once. The event of building can be 
broken down into smaller subevents, e.g., the events of building from 8 am to 
5 pm every weekday. It may, alternatively, be broken into the subevents of 
setting up the iron bars, adding the concrete and so on. These subdivisions 
can be based on any factor (e.g., time, mode of construction, kinds of labor 
employed) and can be made as fine-grained as needed. The endpoint of any 
such subevent is an arbitrary endpoint. Therefore each telic event can be 
characterized as referring to at least the join of all its subevents. 
In addition to the actual event it is possible to have subevents or states 
that could be classified as belonging to the preparatory process or the resul-
tant state of the event. For example, consider again the event of building a 
bridge. The actual construction of the bridge falls between I and FN , but 
subevents like getting a loan, drawing up the plans, etc., will be parts of 
the preparatory process. The resultant state refers to the state that holds 
after the bridge has been constructed. The structure presented in Figure 3 
above is the entire temporal schema of an accomplishment; possibly, only 
some parts of it may be represented in a discourse. 
2.3 Achievements 
Achievements are quite like accomplishments, but differ from them in that 
they are instantaneous and do not require an obligatory process leading to 
the culmination. For example, "spot a cat" is an achievement, which does 
not require any preparatory process. There are, on the other hand, events 
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that are achievements requiring some activity before the achievement takes 
place. For example, "win a race" is a predicate that at least requires that 
the participant do some running before he can win the race. Unlike for 
accomplishments, a proper subevent of the achievement cannot be called 
"winning the race," because the predicate "win" applies only to the point at 
which the race is won. 
A major characteristic of achievements that distinguish them from ac-
complishments is that their preliminary processes are detachable. In the 
case of an accomplishment such as "building the house," all subevents of the 
building process may be referred to as "building the house." The same is not 
true of an achievement such as "winning the race." The temporal schema of 
an achievement may be depicted as in Figure 4 below. 
preparatory 
stages 
I 
preliminary stages 
(optional) 
resultant 
state 
Figure 4: The Structure of Achievements 
2.4 Activities' 
Activities are homogeneous events that do not have any natural endpoints 
and, therefore, can end at any time. But, like accomplishments, activities can 
comprise of smaller events and preparatory processes as well. For example, 
consider the discourse presented in text 6. 
6. When John collected sea shells on the beach, 
a) He badly needed a break from his work. 
b) He collected many kinds of sea shells. 
c) He had to wear his glasses. 
d) He was relaxed. 
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We may have reference to the preparatory process and the resultant states 
just as we did in the case of accomplishments and achievements. In the text 
presented above 6a and 6c refer to the time before John actually collected 
any sea shells. 6b refers to the subevents of the activity and 6d refers to 
the resultant state that obtained after the end of the activity. The fact that 
reference can be made to intervals that lie before or after the actual walking 
event shows that preparatory processes and resultant states are not restricted 
to the class of culminated events. Rather, as will become clear in §3 they 
result from the aspect that the speaker uses to represent the situation. This 
motivates the temporal schema for activities diagramed in Figure 5. 
preparatory 
stage 
I 
E 
resultant 
state 
Figure 5: The Structure of Activities 
3 Foil Theory 
While a schema is the maximal representation of an event only parts of it are 
introduced into the discourse. It is these parts that I call the foil. A sentence 
mayor may not introduce a new foil. A new foil is introduced obligatorily for 
when-clauses, adverbial clauses, and when the temporal schema of a sentence 
does not fit in with the existing foil (either semantically or pragmatically). 
The crucial idea is that aspect is what the speaker uses to refer to the event , 
and with which the speaker can introduce all or part of the situation into the 
discourse. In the subsections that follow I explain how the foil is constructed 
for a discourse and how the text is interpreted semantically. 
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3.1 Aspect 
Aspect is best defined as the viewpoint of the speaker towards a situation. 
Aspect is usually divided into two kinds: the perfective and the imperfective. 
The perfective aspect describes the situation as a complete whole (e.g., sen-
tence 7), without any reference to its internal dynamics. The imperfective 
aspect is a view of the situation internally (e.g., sentence 8). For example, 
while sentence 7 presents the event of eating an apple as a whole, sentence 8 
presents the situation as an ongoing event. 
7. John ate an apple. 
8. John was eating an apple. 
Though the definition of the perfective seems fairly straightforward, at 
this point I would like to mention that there is some ambiguity in it. It has 
been suggested by Comrie that the real definition of the perfective ought to 
specify the given action was complete, rather than completed [1976]. This 
distinction is not as important in English as it is in many other languages, 
e.g., Hindi, Japanese, and Chinese. The temporal relations in these languages 
are a little different from those in English because the neutral perfective 
aspect [Singh, 1991] introduces a foil that is different from the foil introduced 
by the perfective. However, in this paper I present an analysis only of the 
common perfective. 
3.2 The Perfective Aspect and Foil Theory 
When a situation is introduced by a speaker into a discourse, its temporal 
schema becomes available (as the initial foil) for temporally locating succes-
sive sentences. In cases where an event is introduced by a sentence in the 
perfective, the entire temporal schema becomes available. If the sentences 
that follow are also in the perfective aspect, they add their schemata to the 
existing foil. As an example, consider Figure 6, which is a diagrammatic 
representation of the three versions of sentence 9 below. 
9. When they built the 39th street bridge ... 
a) A local architect drew up the plans. 
b) They used the best materials. 
c) They solved most of the traffic problems. 
11 
drawing 
plans 
I 
1+---""-- building the bridge ----.j 
solving 
traffic 
problems 
Figure 6: Interaction of Events Represented in the Perfective Aspect 
From the various interpretations possible for the perfective, we may con-
clude that the perfective introduces a foil that includes the entire temporal 
schema of the event. Succeeding sentences of the discourse may refer to 
any subevent of the foil or to the join of any of them. In the algebraic 
semantics of events due to Krifka that I adopt here, a set of events is distin-
guished in the model. The join (notated U) is a binary operator on events 
that yields new events-the set of events must be closed under this oper-
ator. Intuitively, the join of two events represents their mereological sum. 
If the two argument events have certain spatio-temporal histories, their join 
has a history which is a union of those histories; if the events affect certain 
objects, the join affects them too. It is perhaps obvious that join is asso-
ciative, i.e., (el U e2) U e3 = el U (e2 U e3)' Please consult [Krifka, 1989; 
Krifka, 1991] for further details. 
Returning to the example at hand, sentence 9a refers to the subevent 
PI U P2 introduced on the foil by the when-clause. Sentence 9b may refer to 
el U e2 U e3, i.e., to the join of all the subevents in which the actual building 
of the bridge took place. Sentence 9c may refer to the resultant state R. 
3.3 The Progressive Aspect and Foil Theory 
To characterize the case of the progressive properly, I shall first discuss dis-
courses initiated with a sentence in the progressive and the those which are 
initiated by a perfective and followed by those in the progressive. 
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10. When they were building the bridge, 
a) They were using the best materials. 
b) They were solving their traffic problems. 
c) A local architect was drawing up the plans. 
11. When they were building the bridge, 
a) They used the best materials. 
b) They solved their traffic problems. 
c) A local architect drew up the plans. 
In the discourse presented in example 10, the foil is introduced by a sen-
tence in the progressive. I submit that if the speaker chooses to use the 
progressive viewpoint aspect, then he voluntarily brings into the discourse 
only a part of the representation of the introduced event. That is, it auto-
matically excludes the preparatory process and the resultant state from the 
temporal schema of the event. What remain are the subevents of the core 
event, in the above example, the actual building of a bridge. These are all 
that is available to the speaker. All subsequent references to the introduced 
event are then references to a part of the schema introduced previously. As 
the discourse proceeds, the speaker may refer to any of the subevents and 
their preparatory processes or resultant states. This is an important point, 
because while the preparatory processes and resultant states are not available 
for the entire event, they are used for the internal subevents. 
Consider the following examples, where the first sentence is in the per-
fective but the next one is in the progressive. 
12. When John ate apples, 
a) He was talking to Bill. 
b) He was feeling unwell. 
c) He was hungry. 
13. When John was eating apples, 
a) He was talking to Bill. 
b) He was feeling unwell. 
c) He was hungry. 
In discourse 12, since the foil is introduced by a sentence in the perfective 
aspect, subsequent discourse can be anchored to any part of it. That IS, 
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sentence 12a implies overlap of the activity of talking with the event of eating 
apples; sentence 12b implies that the state holds at the time of eating; and 
sentence 12c implies that John was hungry before he ate apples (using the 
pragmatic rule of causality). 
However, in discourse 13, where the temporal schema is introduced with 
the progressive aspect, only the actual event is available. Subsequent dis-
course has to be anchored to it, and not to its preparatory stage or resultant 
state. Therefore, sentence 13c cannot have the interpretation that John was 
hungry before he ate the apple. Rather, it means that John was hungry for 
some subevent of the eating of the apples. 
3.4 Preparatory Process and Preliminary Stages 
In the examples presented in §2, I distinguished between the preparatory 
process and the preliminary stages. It may not seem very clear at the outset 
where the line should actually be drawn between these two concepts; e.g., it 
might seem that the preliminary stages of an event are merely the preparatory 
processes for the rest of it and the preparatory processes of an event are the 
preliminary stages of the greater event. However, it is easy to see that the 
distinction is principled from at least the linguistic standpoint.' Consider 
the case where the first sentence, i.e., the one which introduces the foil, is 
an achievement. In text 14 below, the initial sentence is in the perfective 
aspect; in text 15, the initial sentence is in the progressive aspect. 
14. When John won the race, he took steroids. 
15. When John was winning the race, he took steroids. 
The interpretation of the discourse in 14 is that John took the steroids 
before the actual running commenced, i.e., during the preparatory process. 
This interpretation is most easily obtained if one invokes the pragmatic rule 
of enablement with the view that it was taking steroids that made it possible 
for him to emerge victorious in the race. In the discourse in 15, however, the 
taking of the steroids is forced to have the interpretation of having taken place 
during the running because the preparatory process is not brought forth on 
the foil by the progressive aspect. The pragmatic rule cannot help push the 
taking of the steroid event before the running event because of restrictions 
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on temporal reference imposed by the foil theory. This is important because 
while the notions of preparatory stages and preliminary processes have been 
thought to be important in the literature [Moens and Steedman, 1988; Smith, 
1991], no justification of their definitions and of the distinction between them 
has been available. 
3.5 The Perfect and the Futurate 
The perfect and the futurate are two of the categories known from traditional 
grammar. However, they are each more complex than the tense and aspect 
categories and have features of both. The perfect is a combination of the 
perfective aspect and a tense. The tense of a perfect construction may be 
the present or the past. The perfective aspect and present tense is the simple 
perfect or the present perfect. The perfective aspect and the past tense is the 
past perfect. The futurate is the perfective aspect and the future tense. The 
categories of perfect and futurate are special in some ways for our purposes 
also. 
It was first noted by Reichenbach that the grammatical category of the 
perfect alludes to three points, namely, the reference time (RT), speech time 
(ST) and the event time (ET) [Reichenbach, 1947]. Briefly, ST is the time 
at which the given utterance is made, ET is the time at which the described 
event occurs and RT is the time from the standpoint of which the event is 
described. With various combinations of these times, we can arrive at the 
general schema for the present perfect, past perfect and the futurate. In a 
sentence in the present perfect, e.g., 16, the ST and the RT are the same and 
the time of the event referred to precedes the time of speech. This is shown 
in Figure 7. 
16. John has won the race. 
As mentioned above, the perfect can also be used in the past, not just 
in the present. For example, consider sentences 17 and 18. The past perfect 
suggests that there is a reference time, namely, yesterday such that at that 
time Henry had the property of having danced or having eaten an apple, 
respectively. In particular, it requires that Henry still exist as a separate 
entity at the reference time, i.e., be alive then. 
17. Henry had danced yesterday. 
15 
ET ST=RT 
Figure 7: Temporal Schema for the Present Perfect 
18. Henry had eaten an apple yesterday. 
The futurate occurs only in the future and is exemplified in sentences 19 
and 20 below. The futurate implies that there will be a time such that Henry 
will have the attributes of having danced or having eaten an apple. Because 
of its close resemblance with the perfect, the futurate is sometimes also called 
the Future Perfect. 
19. Henry will have danced tomorrow. 
20. Henry will have eaten an apple tomorrow. 
The schemata for the past perfect and the futurate as given by Reichen-
bach are presented in Figures 8 and 9, respectively. 
ET RT ST 
Figure 8: Temporal Schema for the Past Perfect 
ST ET=RT 
Figure 9: Temporal Schema for the Futurate 
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3.6 The Perfective versus the Perfect 
While the perfective is subsumed in the categories of the perfect and the 
futurate, there are still some reasons for studying it by itself. These include 
the following. The perfect is not an aspectual category; rather, it is a gram-
matical category that many natural languages employ to relate an event to 
a reference time. For example, sentence 21 is in the perfect, and as a result 
of being in the perfect, its subject i.e., 'John,' is attributed the property of 
having won the world championship. The perfect would imply that at the 
reference time, (which equals the speech time) the property of having won 
the world championship applies to John. But if the situation happens to be 
such that Bill died in a car accident after he won the world championship, 
then the simple perfect will no longer hold though the perfective will. For 
example, sentence 22 will be true at all times after the winning has taken 
place. In general, the perfect can be interpreted as being a statement of the 
attribution of a property to an individual. The attribution essentially holds 
till the reference time but may not hold after that. In the case of the perfec-
tive, since there is no such attribution, the truth value will be the same at 
all subsequent times. The temporal schema for the present perfect is given 
in Figure 10. 
21. John has won the world championship. 
22. John won the world championship. 
ST=RT 
ET 
Figure 10: The Structure of the Present Perfect 
One important difference between the perfect and the perfective is the 
following. The perfect tends to seal off the temporal schema of the event it 
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introduces, making it difficult to refer to events or times inside it with later 
sentences. Thus while all the combinations in sentence 1 are grammatical, 
the corresponding cases with the perfect replacing the perfective in the main 
clause are not. It seems that while each case in sentence 23 is ungrammatical, 
it could be made grammatical by using the perfect consistently in all the 
subordinate clauses, as in sentence 24. Interestingly, in sentence 24, the 
event time of the when-clause becomes the reference time for the succeeding 
subordinate clause. Since these times may be intervals rather than points, it 
is possible that they overlap in time. 
23. When they had built the 39th street bridge, ... 
a)* A local architect drew up the plans. 
b)* They used the best materials. 
c)* They solved most of the traffic problems. 
24. When they had built the 39th street bridge, ... 
a) A local architect had drawn up the plans. 
b) They had used the best materials. 
c) They had solved most of the traffic problems. 
At this point I would like to emphasize that since the perfect is a combina-
tion of the perfective and a tense (past, present or future) there is a tendency 
for it to occur with culminated events. This tendency has been viewed as 
a necessity by Moens and Steedman [1988]. Cognitively speaking, when a 
speaker uses a perfect construction, he wishes to depict a complete event as 
having taken place with reference at a particular time. The event, therefore, 
takes on a point-like characteristic, since reference to its preparatory pro-
cesses and resultant states can no longer be made. I would like to emphasize, 
however, that the perfect is available for all situation types. Consider the 
following examples. 
25. Mary has known French. (state) 
26. Mary has swum in the pond. (activity) 
27. John has built a house. (accomplishment) 
28. John has won the race. (achievement) 
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It seems that the only reason why examples of un culminated events pro-
vided by Moens and Steedman seem wrong is that they do not have pragmat-
ically correct attributes. Consider, for example, sentences 29 and 30 provided 
by them as being ungrammatical. 
29. John has hummed. 
30. The clock has ticked. 
The reason why these are ungrammatical is that the subject cannot be 
very easily attributed the property of having hummed (as in sentence 29) or 
having ticked (as in sentence 30). It might, however, be possible to attribute 
the property of having knocked at the door (which too is a semelfactive) as 
in sentence 31. 
31. John has knocked at the door. 
Sentence 32 below is also grammatical since one can felicitously attribute 
the property of having ticked a particular time to a clock. 
32. The clock has ticked 6 o'clock. 
The basic idea here is that the property we attribute to the subject must 
be special or, at least, be an attributable one. The greater the pragmatic 
relevance of the attribution, the better the grammaticality of the sentence. 
My basic claim, then, is that the perfect is no way restricted to telic events. 
The perfect essentially depicts the event as an unanalyzed whole, thereby 
presenting it as momentous. 
4 Conclusions 
The temporal ontology of events and the effects of the sentences in a discourse 
on the cognitive states of the participants are both important issues. In this 
paper, I have presented a view of events that sees the contributions of the 
sentences that describe them on the cognitive states of the participants as 
their most significant feature. This contribution is intimately related to both 
the objective properties of events and to the perspectives on them taken by. 
the speakers of the sentences. 
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The main idea of this paper is that each individual sentence is associated 
with a temporal schema and each discourse in any given state is associated 
with a foil. The foil of the discourse as it has progressed to a certain point 
constrains the contributions made by the schema of the next sentence; how-
ever, the schema of a sentence can itself be determined without reference to 
the sentences surrounding it. This simple idea can then be used to motivate 
a principled distinction on cognitive grounds between the perfective and the 
progressive aspects, as well as between the perfective and the perfect, which is 
an important category from traditional grammar. The same idea also yields 
a clear distinction between the preliminary stages and preparatory processes 
of an event. 
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